COMMENTS
Remedies for Fraud on the Patent Office
Upon application to the Patent Office and compliance with the
requirements of the Patent Act,' an inventor is granted 2 the right to
prohibit others from manufacturing, selling, or using an invention
claimed in a patent.3 Although the Patent Office attempts to develop
information relevant to each application, limited resources 4 and lack
of access to relevant unpublished data force it to rely heavily on information submitted by applicants.5 Even when disclosure is candid and
complete, the Office sometimes issues patents that should not have been
issued. The chances of error are obviously increased when an applicant
1 35 U.S.C. §§ I et seq. (1970). The subject matter covered by the patent must be a
"process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or... improvement thereof,"
id. § 101, which is "new and useful," id., and not obvious from the prior art in
the field, id. § 103. The applicant must be the first inventor and must not have lost or
abandoned the right to a patent, id. §§ 102(c), (f). The application must describe the
invention in sufficient detail to enable one skilled in the relevant art to make and use the
invention, id. § 112, and the portion of the described matter that constitutes the invention
must be distinctly claimed, id. § 112. An applicant may appeal an initial rejection of his
application through the Patent Office and, if necessary, to the courts, id. §§ 134, 141, 145
& 146.
2 The Patent Office usually evaluates the merits of a patent application in ex parte
proceedings. Ladd, Business Aggression Under the Patent System, 26 U. cIm. L. REv. 353,

356 (1959). When it appears that two or more pending applications cover the same invention, the question of which applicant was the first inventor is decided in an adversary
proceeding known as an interference. 35 U.S.C. § 135; 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.201, 1.212 (1973).
3 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970). The grant must be temporary, U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, and
currently extends for seventeen years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1970). A patent holder can issue
licenses under a patent or transfer all rights by assignment of the patent. Id. § 261; see
Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 88-89 (1902). Unless otherwise noted, this
comment considers only original patentees. A patentee can enforce patent rights in an
infringement action. The court can award various remedies: damages or treble damages
for past infringement, 35 U.S.C. § 284; see American Safety Table Co. v. Schreiber, 415
F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1969), Cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1038 (1970); an injunction against further
infringement, 35 U.S.C. § 283; and, in exceptional cases, attorney's fees. Id. § 285.
4 The situation has not changed appreciably since Learned Hand noted: "Examiners
have neither the time nor the assistance to exhaust the prior art; nothing is more common
in a suit for infringement than to find that all the important references are turned up
for the first time by the industry of a defendant whose interest animates his search."
Rosenberg v. Groov-Pin Corp., 81 F.2d 46, 47 (2d Cir. 1936). See generally Graham v.
John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966); Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779, 794 (C.C.P.A. 1970);
Ladd, supra note 2.
5 See Ladd, supra note 2, at 356-57.
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deliberately or inadvertently conceals, misrepresents, or falsifies relevant
information. 6
Proof that a patent is invalid-that it should not have been issuedis a complete defense to an infringement action brought under that
patent,7 but it is not a ground for an affirmative action for damages.
The patentee thus retains undeserved gains reaped from an invalid
patent prior to a judgment of invalidity. Moreover, the patent statutes
generally do not penalize deliberate attempts to deceive the Patent
Office s by misrepresenting, falsifying, or concealing relevant information.9
Under certain judicially created doctrines, fraud on the Patent Office
is a ground for cancellation of a patent, 10 a defense to an infringement
suit," and an element of certain antitrust causes of action. 12 This comment suggests that existing statutory and judicial sanctions provide
inadequate deterrence and redress for fraud on the Patent Office and
proposes several legal theories that offer more effective sanctions. 13
6 "Fraud" in this comment is used to mean deliberate misrepresentation, falsification, or
concealment of information with intent to deceive the Patent Office.
7 35 U.S.C. §§ 282(2), 282(3) (1970). The defense is predicated on the patentee's failure to
comply with one or more of certain prerequisites of patentability. It is also possible, of
course, to bring an action for a declaratory judgment that a specific patent is invalid.
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970).
8 Whether negligence in disclosure should be sanctioned is beyond the scope of this
comment, but that issue can be profitably contrasted with the effect of sanctions for fraud.
Performance of the patent system's essential function of "promot[ing] the progress of
science and the useful arts," U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, requires that a patent be of significant
benefit to potential inventors. Severe sanctions for mere negligence could discourage holders of valid patents from initiating infringement suits and thus risking a declaration that
the patent is invalid. This consideration argues against severe sanctions for invalidity that
results from mere negligence, because the sanction would limit the patent's stimulus to
invention. But the argument is not equally applicable to severe sanctions for fraud, because fraud requires deliberate misrepresentation, leaving the nonfraudulent patentee
with less reason to fear application of the sanction.
9 Although disclaimer of invalid claims and reissue of a patent to correct defective
claims or specifications are available only if the invalidity or defect arose "without any
deceptive intention" by the patentee, 35 U.S.C. §§ 251, 253 (1970), denial of reissue to
the fraudulent patentee merely prevents the regrant of patent rights that the law otherwise denies the would-be patentee because of fraud. Denial of disclaimer also fails to
provide an adequate sanction. See note 24 infra.
10 See text and notes at notes 14-17 infra.
11 See text and notes at notes 18-27 infra.
12 See text and notes at notes 28-52 infra.
13 The fact that actions predicated on fraud on the Patent Office are rare has been
viewed as evidence that this fraud is not a serious problem. Cochran, HistoricalReview of
Fraud in Patent Procurement: The Standards and Procedures for Doing Business Before
the Patent Office, 52 J. Pat. OFF. Soc'y 71, 76, 80 (1970); Joel, Fraud in the Procurementof
a Patent, 49 J. PAT. OFF.Soc'y 596, 605-06 (1967). This premise is questionable. See Ram,
Patent Fraud:A New Defense?, 54 J. PAT. OFF.Soc'Y 863, 371 (1972). Even if it is correct,
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I. PRESENT REMEDIES
A. The Cancellation Suit
The federal government has the right, inherent in its constitutional
power to grant patents, to sue for cancellation of a patent for fraud in
its procurement. 4 Cancellation terminates patent rights ab initio;1 the
patentee can no longer sue to enforce patent rights, and licensees are
entitled to recoup royalties paid prior to cancellation.
Private parties cannot sue for cancellation, 16 and the government
rarely seeks this remedy.' 7 Cancellation is therefore an inadequate
procedure for remedying and deterring patent fraud.
B.

The Unenforceability Defense

PrecisionInstrument ManufacturingCo. v. Automotive Maintenance
Machinery Co. established that fraud in the procurement of a patent is
however, the proposition supports this comment's view that available remedies provide
insufficient incentive to private actions for fraud.
14 United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 815 (1888); United States v. Gunning,
18 F. 511 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883).
15 United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 73 F. Supp. 979 (D. Del. 1947).
16 Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. 434 (1871).
17 The government has sued for cancellation of a fraudently procured patent only ten
times. United States v. American Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224 (1897); United States v.
American Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888); United States v. Saf-T-Boom Corp., 431 F.2d
737 (8th Cir. 1970); United States v. Marifarms, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 858 (D. Del. 1972) (preliminary injunction proceeding); United States v. Standard Elec. Time Co., 155 F. Supp.
949 (D. Mass. 1957); United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., 73 F. Supp. 979 (D. Del. 1947);
United States v. Cold Metal Process Co., 62 F. Supp. 127 (N.D. Ohio 1945); United States v.
Colgate, 21 F. 318 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1884); United States v. Gunning, 18 F. 511 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1883); Attorney General ex rel Hecker v. Runford Chem. Works, 32 F. 608 (C.C.D.R.I.
1876). United States v. Fraser, 22 F. 106 (N.D. Ill. 1884), was dismissed as only colorably
brought in the name of the United States. Some cases, of course, may have been settled
before judgment and are thus unreported. Moreover, the government has only once invoked 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1970), which provides criminal penalties for fraud on a government agency, for fraud on the Patent Office. Mas v. United States, 151 F.2d 32 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 326 U.S. 776 (1945). Senator Birch Bayh, introducing legislation directed at
fraud on the Patent Office commented that despite section 1001, "little law enforcement
action has been taken against such fraudulent conduct." 147 PATENT TADn-mAmu & CopyFiGHT J. A-5 (Oct. 4, 1973).
It is uncertain whether the Federal Trade Commission will take significant action
under American Cyanamid Co., 63 F.T.C. 1747, 1857-62 (1963), rev'd on other grounds,
American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 563 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1966), in which it was held
inter alia that enforcement of rights conferred by a fraudulently procured patent could
be an unfair competitive practice under the Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15
U.S.C. § 45 (1970). Private parties cannot sue under the American Cyanamid doctrine;
the Federal Trade Commission Act, id. §§ 41-58 (1970), is not an antitrust law within
the meaning of id. § 15 (1970), and thus does not come under the provision authorizing private treble damage suits for violation of the antitrust laws, id. § 12. See
Lippa's, Inc. v. Lenox, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 182, 186 (D. Vt. 1969). See also Nashville Milk
Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 878, 374-76 (1958).
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a defense to an infringement suit brought under that patent because
fraud renders the patent unenforceable.' 8 Although language in the
PrecisionInstrument opinion provides a basis for extensive application
of the doctrine, 19 subsequent cases have differed about whether the
defense may be predicated on nonmaterial misrepresentations 20 or on
18 324 U.S. 806 (1945). Although the defense is based on the equitable doctrine of
unclean hands, it defeats claims for damages as well as claims for injunctive relief. Id;
Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 312 F. Supp. 778, 781 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (by implication),
aff'd, 456 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1972). Courts sometimes characterize the assertion of fraudulent
procurement as a challenge to the validity of a patent. E.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc.
v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 176 (1965).
19 "The far-reaching social and economic consequences of a patent, therefore, give the
public a paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies spring from backgrounds
free from fraud or other inequitable conduct ..... 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945). Thus, the
doctrine apparently encompasses some inequitable conduct not rising to the level of fraud.
Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Davis-Edwards Pharmacal Corp., 443 F.2d 867 (2d Cir. 1971);
Corning Glass Works v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 253 F. Supp. 461 (D. Del. 1966).
20 One line of cases holds that fraud renders a patent unenforceable only if the fraud
was material in the sense that, but for the fraud, the patent would not have been issued.
Henkels & McCoy, Inc. v. Elkin, 316 F. Supp. 303, 309 (W.D. Pa. 1970) (dictum-patent was
held invalid); Monsanto Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 312 F. Supp. 452, 463 (S.D. Tex.
1970); Waterman-Bic Pen Corp. v. W.A. Sheaffer Pen Co., 267 F. Supp. 849, 856 (D. Del.
1967); Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Tatnall Measuring Sys. Co., 169 F. Supp. 1,
24-25 (E.D. Pa. 1958); Tate Eng'r, Inc. v. United States, 477 F.2d 1336, 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
Other cases suggest that a patent would be unenforceable if the fraud might have caused
the issuance of the patent. Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldstein's Sons, Inc., 461 F.2d 66, 73
(3d Cir. 1972) (dictum implied by treatment of Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 312
F. Supp. 778 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Coming Glass Works v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 253 F.
Supp. 461, 470-71 (D. Del. 1967); Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Sherwood Medical Indus.,
Inc., 175 U.S.P.Q. 337, 345-46 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Penn Yan Boats, Inc. v. Sea Lark Boats,
Inc., 175 U.S.P.Q. 260, 272 (S.D. Fla. 1972). SCM Corp. v. RCA, 318 F. Supp. 433, 448
(S.D.N.Y. 1970) explicitly rejects the material fraud standard. In Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v.
Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944), in which fraud had been committed on a court
deciding a patent case, the Court found it unnecessary to "appraise the influence that
the [fraud] exerted." Id. at 247.
Several cases suggest that serious lack of candor by a patent applicant renders a patent
unenforceable. These cases focus on the patentee's conduct rather than the effect that
the conduct might have had on Patent Office action. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v.
Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 818 (1945) ("Public interest demands
that all facts . . . be submitted . . . to the Patent Office, which can then pass upon
... the evidence."); See also Monsanto Co. v. Rohm & Hass Co., 456 F.2d 592, 598-99
(3d Cir. 1972); Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc., 428 F.2d 555, 565 (5th
Cir. 1970) (also reported in 439 F.2d 1369) (" 'uncompromising duty' of good faith disclosure'); Corning Glass Works v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 253 F. Supp. 461, 471
(D. Del. 1967); Abington Textile Mach. Works v. Carding Specialists (Canada) Ltd., 249
F. Supp. 823, 839-40 (D.D.C. 1965) (dictum).
In several cases that require proof of material fraud a "relevant information" standard
would have led to the same result. For example, in Monsanto Co. v. Dawson Chem.
Co., 312 F. Supp. 452, 463 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (material fraud requirement), the patentee's
fraud was described as "a small corner of a broad picture" and in Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton
Corp. v. Tatnall Measuring Sys. Co., 169 F. Supp. 1, 25 (E.D. Pa. 1958) (material fraud
requirement), it was characterized as "an insignificant part of the argument."
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misrepresentations made without deliberate intent to deceive. 21
A material misrepresentation requirement calls for proof that, on the
true facts, the patent should not have been issued. Presumably, a
meritorious patent application will be approved at some point in
the issuance process; thus, fraud in such a patent application is
not a material cause of issuance. This requirement sharply limits the
value of the defense of unenforceability as a sanction for fraudulent
procurement of a patent. 2
The defendant in an infringement action has no additional incentive
to prove material fraud, because proof that the patent should not have
been issued (irrespective of whether issuance is due to fraud) is in
itself a complete defense to an infringement action 23 Furthermore, the
sanctions imposed on the patentee for fraud and for mere invalidity
24
are identical.
Even if materiality is not an element of the defense, unenforceability
provides neither an adequate remedy nor an effective deterrent. 25 Un21 Although there are few cases in point, it is apparently unnecessary for the defense
to prove that the patent applicant has acted with actual knowledge that the representations to the Patent Office were false or misleading. "[Giross negligence as to ... truth"
may suffice, Norton v. Curtiss, 438 F.2d 779, 796 (C.C.P.A. 1970), as may recklessness,
Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp. v. Tatnall Measuring Sys. Co., 169 F. Supp. 1, 24-25
(E.D. Pa. 1958) (by implication). In Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 817 (1945), where applicant had failed to disclose certain
facts, the Court seemed unwilling to draw fine distinctions as to whether the applicant
knew the facts or strongly suspected them.
Nonetheless, a good faith effort to disclose all material believed to be pertinent may
excuse a failure to disclose relevant material. Scott Paper Co. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.,
432 F.2d 1198, 1204-05 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 913 (1971). But see note 20

supra.
22

See text and notes at notes 38-44 infra.

23 See text and note at note 7 supra.
24 Statutory provisions concerning the availability and effect of disclaimer of invalid
claims apply only to claims made "without any deceptive intention." A patent in which a
claim is both invalid and fraudulent is not covered by these statutory provisions and is
subject to the common law rule that the invalidity of any one claim of a patent renders
all other claims of that patent void. See Kearney & Trecker Corp. v.Giddings & Lewis,
Inc., 452 F.2d 579, 596 (7th Cir. 1971); Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Alloy Surfaces Co., 339
F. Supp. 859, 875-76 (D. Del. 1972).
This common law sanction for fraud is arbitrary in its operation. First, the harm
caused by the fraudulent claim is measured by its commercial success, but the severity of
the sanction depends on the commercial success of the other claims. Since different claims
may vary in commercial success, the sanction could be less severe than the initial harm.
Second, even if the severity of the sanction approaches the severity of the initial harm to
competitors, the common law rule does not effectively redress the harm to an alleged
infringer. Third, although the value a patentee has gained from a fraudulent claim
increases as the term of the patent expires, the severity of the sanction diminishes
because the voided claims have a shorter term to run.
25 Cf. Rosenberg, The Assertion of a Fraud Upon the Patent Office as a Means of De-
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enforceability fails to redress the harm caused by the invalid patent
prior to adjudication; the patentee retains prior profits made through
use of the patent rights. The unenforceability defense also fails to deter
the patent applicant who could not, on the actual facts, procure a
patent; misrepresentation is costless 26 and may yield a patent that
produces gains until a court determines that it was procured by
27
fraud.
C.

The Antitrust Sanction

An effective remedy for fraud on the Patent Office would redress harm
caused by the fraud by requiring the patentee to disgorge profits obtained
through the use of the patent prior to a declaration of invalidity. Indeed, to deter fraud the expected damages must exceed the expected
gains to the patentee from fraud. In Walker ProcessEquipment, Inc. v.
Food Machinery & Chemical Corp.,28 the Supreme Court indicated that
such a remedy might be available to private parties under section 2 of the
Sherman Act 2 9 Although conduct otherwise violative of the antitrust
laws is normally protected from prosecution by a patent,30 the Court
held in Walker Process that there is no immunity to a charge of
monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act81 if the patent was
obtained by fraud on the Patent Office.8 2
The Walker Process doctrine has been characterized as the first effective weapon against fraudulent procurement.33 This description is
overly optimistic; claims or counterclaims under the doctrine have
feating the Patent Monopoly, 50 J. PAT. orr. Soc'r 455, 479 (1968) (suggesting that the
remedies available prior to the Walker Process doctrine, see text and notes at notes 28-32
infra, comprised only modest protection against fraud on the Patent Office).
26 Funds invested in exploitation of a fraudulently procured patent are lost when the
patent is declared unenforceable. Strictly speaking, however, the fraud does not cause this

loss, but only makes possible an improvident investment.
27 The suggestion in Nashua Corp. v. RCA, 307 F. Supp. 152, 158 (D.N.H. 1969),
that a licensee may, upon proving that a patent is unenforceable for fraud, recoup royalties
paid under the agreement is unsupported and unprecedented dictum. A holding to the same
effect was reversed in Troxel Mfg. Co. v. Schwinn Bicycle Co., 465 F.2d 1253 (6th Cir. 1972).
28 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
80 382 U.S. at 176. United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287, 309 (1948) (Sherman
Act); United States v. Parker-Rust-Proof Co., 61 F. Supp. 805, 812 (ED. Mich. 1945) ("antitrust -laws"). But a "patent . . . does not give the patentee any exemption . . . beyond
the limits of the patent monopoly." United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 196-97
29

(1963).
81 15 US.C. § 2 (1970).

32 An assignee of the patentee retains antitrust immunity unless it is shown that the
assignee was aware of the patentee's fraud. 382 U.S. at 177 & n.5, 179 (Harlan, J., concurring).
83 Rosenberg, supra note 25, at 484-85.
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failed in nineteen of twenty cases. 34 The doctrine has several critical
problems that limit its effectiveness as a sanction for fraud.
1. The "Significant Competition" Limitation. The Walker Process
sanction reaches only fraudulently procured patents that result in
"monopoly" within the meaning of the antitrust laws.35 Since a patented
invention may be subject to significant economic competition from
substitute products, 30 a patent monopoly is not necessarily a monopoly
under section 2 of the Sherman Act. The significant competition restric34 A counterclaim under Walker Process was successful in Kearney & Trecker Corp. v.
Giddings & Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579 (7th Cir. 1971). In Acme Precision Prods., Inc.
v. American Alloys Corp., 484 F.2d 1237 (8th Cir. 1973), a holding in favor of a Walker
Process claimant was reversed for failure to prove monopolization. The remaining eighteen
cases are: Agrashell, Inc. v. Hammons Prods. Co., 479 F.2d 269 (8th Cir. 1973); Catophote
Corp. v. DeSoto Chem. Coatings, Inc., 450 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1971); Bendix Corp. v. Balan,
Inc., 421 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1970); Donald F. Duncan, Inc. v. Royal Tops Mfg. Co., 381
F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1967); Mueller Brass Co. v. Reading Indus., Inc., 352 F. Supp. 1357
(E.D. Pa. 1972); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., v. Kasser Distillers Prods. Corp., 350 F.
Supp. 1341 (E.D. Pa. 1972); Udin v. J. Kaufman Iron Works, Inc., 342 F. Supp. 1090
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); Struthers Scientific & Int'l Corp. v. General Foods Corp., 334 F. Supp. 1329
(D. Del. 1971); Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc., 328 F. Supp. 1132 (W.D. Tex.
1971); Enviro Air, Inc. v. United Air Specialists, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 633 (S.D. Ohio 1970)
(plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on a claim under Walker Process denied);
SCM Corp. v. RCA, 318 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Brown v. Myerberg, 314 F. Supp.
939 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Kolene Corp. v. Motor City Metal Treating, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1251
(E.D. Mich. 1969); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Riverton Laboratories, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 357
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); Mercantile Natl Bank v. Quest, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Ill. 1969);
Crown Mach. & Tool Co. v. KVP Sutherland Paper Co., 297 F. Supp. 542 (N.D. Cal. 1968);
Diamond Intl Corp. v. Walterhoefer, 289 F. Supp. 550 (D. Md. 1968); Coming Glass Works
v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 253 F. Supp. 461 (D. Del. 1966).
Conclusions based on reported cases may be misleading since the great majority of
private antitrust actions are dismissed pursuant to settlement. Posner, A Statistical Study
of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J. LAw & ECON. 865, 382-83 (1970).
35 Some commentators have suggested that the patent monopoly be considered ipso
facto a monopoly within the meaning of the Sherman Act. Adelman & Brooks, The
Integrity of the Administrative Process, Sherman Section 2 and Per Se Rules-Lessons
of Fraud on the Patent Office, 55 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 255 (1973). It should be evident,
however, that some patents-for example, a patent on one of many equally efficient
processes for producing a given end product--do not result in monopoly power. See note
36 infra.
36 United States v. E. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956), illustrates the
distinction between control of a single product and control of a market. Although defendant Du Pont accounted for 75 percent of domestic cellophane sales by virtue of its almost
exclusive knowledge of the process of manufacturing cellophane, the Court held that
it had not monopolized in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act. The opinion did
not rest on Du Pont's lack of the 100 percent dominance that a patent on cellophane
would have conferred; rather, the Court recognized that other flexible packaging materials
were so similar to cellophane that the relevant market for a monopoly determination was
the market for all flexible packaging materials. Du Pont's share of the sales of flexible
packaging materials was too small to justify a conclusion that it had monopolized that
market.
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tion on Walker Process is sensible-antitrust penalties should not be
imposed on fraudulent patentees who have not caused harm of the
degree and kind contemplated by the antitrust laws-but it is also a major limitation on the effectiveness of the sanction because few patents are
basic enough to allow monopoly of an entire field. Most are for patentable but minor improvements on the prior art. Walker Process thus can
neither redress the harm these patents cause a patentee's potential
competitors nor force the patentee to disgorge the profits obtained
under a fraudulent nonmonopolistic patent.
The Walker Processdoctrine's inability to reach patents that are not
monopolistic in the antitrust sense also weakens its force as a deterrent
to fraudulent applications for patents that do not result in the degree of
monopoly required by section 2 of the Sherman Act. The doctrine may
fail to discourage fraud even in cases that might result in monopoly
when the holder of a basic patent permits competing parties to manufacture and sell the patented invention. Significant price competition
among infringers and licensees could negate the degree of monopoly
essential to a Walker Process claim3 7
2. The "MaterialFraud"Limitation. Lower courts have consistently
interpreted Walker Process to require a claimant to prove material
fraud. 88 The claimant must show that the patent should not have been
issued and that the patentee's fraud was the cause of the error. In many
cases, however, the cause of the error cannot be ascertained. Although
certain statutory requirements for patentability are relatively objec.
87 It should also be noted that the existence of a licensee might negate a claim for
attempting to monopolize. Nonetheless, infringers and licensees are harmed by the fraudulent patent; but for the patent, infringers would have been able to compete more vigorously, see note 47 infra, and licensees would have avoided royalty payments.
Of the twenty cases listed in note 34 supra, sixteen involved Walker Process counterclaims to infringement suits. This suggests either that infringers are the parties most likely

to have sufficient financial interests to justify litigation, or that fraud is unlikely to be
detected except in discovery during a suit brought on other grounds. Thus, Walker Process
will be of little value if the existence of infringers precludes a successful claim. The other
four cases involving original Walker Process claims are not necessarily evidence to the
contrary; in each case the plaintiff raised additional claims. The reports do not indicate
whether the Walker Process claims were added only after discovery disclosed facts indicating fraud.
88 E.g., Beckman Instruments, Inc v. Chemtronics, Inc., 428 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1970);
Corning Glass Works v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 253 F. Supp. 461 (D. Del. 1966).
But see C.B. HAmBuRG, PATENr FRAUD AND INEQurrABLn CoNnucr § 4.01[3][g], at 4-42 (1973).
See also cases cited at note 20 supra. This lower court interpretation of Walker Process is
interesting in light of the Supreme Court's favorable citation in Walker Process of the
language in Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324
U.S. 806 (1945), suggesting an extensive application of remedies for patent fraud. Walker
Process Equip, Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 177 (1965) (citing the
Precision Instrument language reprinted at note 19 supra).
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tive,39 the central question of whether a claimed invention is new and
nonobvious leaves considerable room for the exercise of discretion-

"the [statutory test] . . .is but vaguely defined [and] highly subjec-

tive," 40 and often "what position the examiner would have taken had
4
[the patentee] been candid with him remains a matter of speculation." '
The examiner is not required to give reasons for his decision,4 and the
Patent Office forbids explanatory testimony by the examiners in
private litigation. 43 Thus, if sanctions are imposed only for material
fraud, meritorious claims may be denied for failure of proof.
This problem of proof of material fraud is especially acute in light
of the Walker Process monopoly requirement. The courts have noted
that the commercial success of a patented invention is strong, though not
conclusive, evidence that the invention was indeed patentable. Since
monopolization implies commercial success, it indicates that fraud relevant to whether the patented invention was new, useful, or nonobvious
was probably not material.
3. The Costs of Walker Process Litigation. The Walker Process
claimant will incur expenses in addition to the notoriously high costs
normally associated with antitrust litigation. 45 A Walker Process
claimant must show conduct by the patentee that meets a more narrow
definition of fraud than that required for unenforceability. 46 Moreover,
to prove materiality the claimant must prove the patent's invalidity;
experience in other contexts has shown that the expense can discourage litigation. 47 Finally, the claimant must prove that use of the
89 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1970) (a patent shall not be issued if the invention was in
public use or on sale in this country more than one year prior to the date of the patent
application). Even here there is some subjectivity, for a "use" is not public if it is primarily
for experimental purposes. Smith & Griggs Mfg. Co. v. Sprague, 123 U.S. 249 (1887). See
also Pickering v. Holman, 459 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1972).

40 Ladd, supra note 2, at 355.
41 SCM Corp. v. RCA, 318 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
42 The examiner is required to give reasons for rejecting applications but not for
approving them. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.106, 1.113(b) (1973).
43 SCM Corp. v. RCA, 318 F. Supp. 433, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
44 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). But see Scott Paper Co. v.
Fort Howard Paper Co., 432 F.2d 1198, 1203-04 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 913
(1971); Coming Glass Works v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 253 F. Supp. 461, 469 (D. Del.
1966).
45 See Kohn, Evaluation of an Antitrust Claim, Prospective Cost of Litigation, Standing
to Sue and Preparationof Suit, 38 ANwrrrausr L.J. 7, 10-13 (1969).
46 Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Chemtronics, Inc., 428 F.2d 555, 567 & n.27 (5th Cir.
1970).
47 The costs of a patent lawsuit "can overwhelm a defendant quite as much as losing
it," and it is commonly recognized that some patentees "assert their patents not to vindicate
their rights, but to harass competitors by burdensome patent infringement litigation or
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fraudulent patent generated the patentee's monopoly.48
Although the prospect of a significant recovery under the treble
damage provisions of the Clayton Act 49 may offset a claimant's reluctance to risk the major expense of a Walker Process claim, certain practical considerations vitiate the treble damages incentive.
First, the prospect of substantial recovery is of no value to a claimant
who cannot afford the initial costs of litigation,"0 and the claimant who
can afford to litigate must discount the fruits of a successful claim by
the probability of failure; the low success rate of Walker Process
claims51l dampens a claimant's incentive to litigate. Second, the
the threat of such litigation." Ladd, supra note 2, at 353-54. In addition to the
direct expenses of litigation, an alleged infringer suffers diversion of customers while the
litigation is pending since under 85 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1970), those who buy and either use or
resell an infringing device are themselves liable as infringers. Potential customers, seeking
to avoid a lawsuit or an adverse judgment or having a small financial interest that does
not justify an investigation of the merits of an allegation of infringement, tend to buy
from sources other than the allegedly infringing manufacturer. The resulting loss to a
manufacturer may not be recoverable as a matter of law, even if the allegation of infringement proves false. Furthermore, diverted customers may not return to the alleged infringer
after the claim of infringement is adjudicated or settled. An attempt to prevent customer
diversion by agreeing to indemnify customers against possible liability under section 271(a)
is problematical; potential customers may not be confident enough of the seller's financial
condition to rely on the agreement. See Borkin, The Patent Infringement Suit: Ordeal
by Trial, 17 U. CI. L. REV. 634 (1950); Ladd, supra note 2, at 364 n.50, 373.
A Walker Process counterclaim may delay adjudication of the claim of infringement and
thus increase the counterclaimant's losses from customer diversion. This difficulty can
be avoided by reserving the counterclaim for a separate trial, but this has been done
in only one case. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Kasser Distillers Prod. Corp., 350
F. Supp. 1341, 1368-69 n.29 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
48 Although no case discusses the issue, a patentee who monopolized under a valid
nonfraudulent patent would presumably retain antitrust immunity for that patent
monoply while holding a second unrelated patent that had been fraudulently procured.
Proof of the origin of monopolization would be difficult and expensive when only one
of several interlocking patents was tainted by fraud, or when only one of several claims
under a single patent was fraudulent. See Nashua Corp. v. RCA, 307 F. Supp. 152, 158
(D.Nr.H. 1969).
49 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
50 The statutory provision allowing recovery of attorney's fees applies only to exceptional cases. 35 U.S.C. 285 (1970). Moreover, that provision does not operate "until after
litigation has occurred, and the outlay required to try a lawsuit presenting validity issues
is the factor which undoubtedly forces many alleged infringers into accepting licenses
rather than litigating." Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 813, 347-48 (1971).
51 See text and note at note 34 supra. Moreover, there is reason to believe that Walker
Process claims are not settled as frequently as other private antitrust actions. Since a
private antitrust action often follows successful prosecution by the government, Posner,
supra note 34, at 372, the ability to plead the prior judgment as evidence of an antitrust
violation, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1970), facilitates settlement of the claim. In patent fraud cases,
however, the prior judgment is almost always unavailable, because the government rarely
acts against fraud on the Patent Office. Moreover, if the government action is a cancellation suit, it cannot be pleaded as evidence under 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1970).
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claimant has unique incentives to settle and obtain a share of the
monopoly profits by accepting a license under the fraudulent patent.
If there are no other licensees, the patentee will be the claimant's only
competitor. 52 A settlement, though redressing the harm the licensee has
suffered from the fraudulent patent, allows harm to others to continue
because the patent remains valid and enforceable. The patentee and
the licensee, in a two-seller market, can charge a higher price for the
patented product than would prevail under full competition.
II.

PROPOSED REMEDIES FOR FRAUD ON THE PATENT OFFICE

Unlike the Walker Process doctrine, an effective remedy for fraudur
lent patent procurement should not be limited to monopoly markets, 5
require proof of material fraud, 54 or subject the claimant to excessive
litigation costs.5 5 Unlike the defense of unenforceability, 6 it should
provide full compensatory damages to parties injured by patent fraud.
Furthermore, an effective remedy should provide punitive damages to
57
deter fraud.
A.

The Common Law Fraud Remedy

Damages have neither been awarded nor demanded 8 from the patentee in actions for fraud on the Patent Office other than antitrust actions.
Courts, however, have long awarded both compensatory and punitive damages in other fraud cases. 59 A common law fraud remedy
in patent fraud actions could redress harm through compensatory
damages and deter fraud by patent applicants through punitive damages.
Private suits for damages for patent fraud can meet the five requirements"0 of the common law misrepresentation doctrine.6 1 First, patent
52 See Kennedy, Patent and Antitrust Policy: The Search for a Unitary Theory, 55 GEo.
WAMSI.L. Ray. 512, 532-33 (1967); Note, Improperly Procured Patents: FTC Jurisdiction
and the Remedial Power, 77 HARv. L. REv. 1505, 1511 (1964); cf. SENATE AN-usr Am

MONOPOLY SUBCOMM., S. REP. No. 448, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 145, 152-54 (1961).
53 See text and notes at notes 35-37 supra.
54 See text and notes at notes 38-44 supra.
55 See text and notes at notes 45-52 supra.
56 See text and notes at notes 18-27 supra.
57 A risk neutral patentee will engage in fraud only if the expected gains from a
fraudulent patent application (including potential monopoly profits) exceed the expected
costs (compensatory and punitive damages). The gains from fraud will never be less than
compensatory damages, and may actually exceed them if some victims fail to recover or if
the patentee reaps monopoly profits. Thus, without punitive damages there is no significant deterrent to fraud.
58 But see Coming Glass Works v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp., 253 F. Supp. 461, 464
(D. Del. 1966).
59 See W. PROSSER, TORTS § 110, at 735-36 (4th ed. 1971).
60 See id. § 105, at 685-86.
61 See id. § 105, at 683-94.
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fraud by definition includes a false representation. 6 The defrauding
patentee knows that the representation is false and intends to induce
the injured parties and putative plaintiffs-potential competitors, their
customers, and the patentee's customers-to act or refrain from acting
in reliance on the patent. 3 That plaintiffs act in reliance on the fraud
is established when the representation concerning patentability plays a
substantial part in the competitors' decisions to stay out of the
market, or in the customers' decisions to buy from the patentee and not
from a competitor. 64 Finally, the plaintiffs suffer actual damages as a
result of the fraud, due to either higher prices (customers) or lost
profits (competitors).
In decisions in other fields, courts have indicated the factors relevant
to an award of punitive damages: the potency of other sanctions, the
.impact of the label "fraudulent" on the defendant's business, the
danger that the size of the total award could not be controlled in a
series of actions by different parties on the same fraud, and the
availability of class actions, which render unnecessary the use of punitive damages to encourage litigation of small claims. 65
Under these guidelines, punitive damages are appropriate- in patent
fraud cases. The impotence of present remedies has already been
noted,6 6 a patentee will not suffer greatly from loss of a reputation for
honesty,67 and the possibility of excessive damages is smaller under
common law theories that give courts discretion to award less than the
treble damages required in Walker Process cases. Punitive damages
are thus appropriate, since they would perform a needed deterrent
function and their negative aspects would be minimized. Class actions
would presumably be available for patent fraud claims, and the joint
interests of putative infringers would provide incentives both to dis62 See note 6 supra.
63 Although the misrepresentation is made directly to the Patent Office rather than to

the injured parties, the patentee can be held liable under common law doctrine. When the
plaintiff is an unidentified member of a group and the defendant has reason to expect
that a member of the group will be reached and influenced by the fraud, the courts will
impose liability for intentional deceit. Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Persons, 19
VAND. L. Rav. 231, 246 (1966).
The intent is not merely that the Patent Office grant a patent in reliance on the fraud;
the patentee also intends that in reliance on the allegation and appearance of patentability

customers and competitors will hesitate to infringe or challenge the fraudulently procured
patent.
64 There is no common law requirement of 'but for' materiality. W. PRoSSER, supra note
59, § 110, at 714-15.
65 deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1229-32 (10th Cir. 1970) (securities
fraud); Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1283-86 (2d Cir. 1969) (same).
66 See text and notes at notes 14-52 supra.

67 At least the harm caused by loss of reputation is less than for securities dealers. See
Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276, 1285 (2d Cir. 1969).
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cover fraud and to litigate claims.6 But even if these incentives could
assure enforcement, punitive damages are necessary to make that
enforcement effective
B.

Antitrust Remedies

Under the Walker Process doctrine, a fraudulently procured patent
does not protect a patentee from liability for monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act.69 This restriction on immunity to antitrust
prosecution should be expanded to reach other provisions of the antitrust laws. The following sections critically examine several theories under which a patentee could be subjected to antitrust liability for a
fraudulent patent.
1. Patents as Contracts in Restraint of Trade. A patent can be
viewed as a contract between the patentee and the government with
disclosure of the invention 7 as consideration for a legally enforceable
right to exclude others temporarily from its exploitation. Since a patent
obviously restrains trade, it could qualify as a "contract... in restraint
of trade" prohibited by section 1 of the Sherman Act.7 ' Extension of
the Walker Process doctrine to section 1 of the Sherman Act would
make antitrust sanctions available for use against fraudulently procured
patents. Damages for fraud would run from the day the patent was
issued.
Courts have not fully defined the term "contract" as used in the antitrust statute.72 Patents have occasionally been called contracts, but decisions in these cases have not turned on the description.73 Because
characterization of a patent as a contract could have consequences be68 Defensive action based on these joint interests raises other problems. In one case,
for example, a group of putative infringers agreed that each would contribute to the
defense of any member of the group sued by the patentee for infringement. Although
the court found the agreement unobjectionable, it held that an ancillary agreement that
no member would accept or negotiate a license without first notifying the others violated
section 1 of the Sherman Act. Jones Knitting Corp. v. Morgan, 244 F. Supp. 285 (E.D.
Pa. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 361 F.2d 451 (3d Cir. 1966).
69 See text and notes at notes 29-32 supra.
70 The public benefits from this disclosure in that the invention is available for
public use after the patent expires. Furthermore, even before the patent expires the technology it discloses may stimulate further invention.
71 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
72 "[Formal contract principles should not be literally applied to ascertain if the particular conduct in question is within the framework of section 1." Pearl Brewing Co. v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 945, 950 (S.D. Tex. 1972). Pearl Brewing, which goes
as far as any case in stating the relevant test, attempts to determine whether there is a
"collaborative element," a "common scheme," or "joint action." Id. at 951.
13 United States v. Mariforms, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 858, 861 (D. Del. 1972); United States
v. Hartford-Empire Co., 73 F. Supp. 979, 981 (D. Del. 1947); Fried. Krupp A.-G. v. Midvale
Steel Co., 191 F. 588, 594 (3d Cir. 1911).
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yond the context of fraud, it may be undesirable to suggest the characterization solely to provide a remedy for fraud on the Patent Office.
2. Licenses as Contracts in Restraint of Trade. An agreement by
which one party contracts not to manufacture a given article, or to
manufacture it only upon payment of a royalty, usually constitutes a
restraint of trade.7 4 A patent license involving similar restraints is immune from antitrust prosecution because it partially waives the patentee's right to exclude competitors entirely; when complete exclusion
is permissible, partial exclusion is, by comparison, an expansion of
trade.75 Under an extension of the Walker Process doctrine, however, a
fraudulently procured patent would no longer protect the license from
prosecution under section 1 of the Sherman Act as a "contract in restraint of trade."
This approach would not significantly expand the sanctions for
patent fraud. Only those harmed by antitrust violations may bring
private actions for redress.7 6 Although the licensee and consumers of
the patented item are damaged by restrictions on the licensee's ability
to compete, unlicensed competitors prodded into investigating the
history of the patent under the threat of an infringement suit are
most likely to discover the fraud. These unlicensed competitors suffer
injury because of the fraud, but they are not harmed by the licensee's
impaired ability to compete. On the contrary, they benefit because the
licensed competitor's prices must reflect the royalties required by the
license. Thus, the parties most likely to discover the fraud are those who
cannot, on this restraint of trade theory, bring an action based on the
fraud because they have not been injured by the license contract.
3. Licenses as Perpetuationsof Restraint of Trade. A patent license
diminishes the possibility that the licensee will discover the fraud underlying the patent and bring it to the court's attention; thus, the
license perpetuates the fraudulent patent. Agreements that deceive the
Patent Office into issuing a patent violate the antitrust laws,7 7 and con74 Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 239 F. Supp. 51 (N.D. Ill. 1965), rev'd
on other grounds, 388 F.2d 25 (7th Cir. 1967), afj'd in part, revtd in part on other grounds,
395 U.S. 100 (1969); United States v. Huck Mfg. Co., 227 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Mich. 1964),
af'd, 382 U.S. 197 (1965).
75 A. 8: E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1968).
76 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
77 American Cyanamid Co., 63 F.T.C. 1747 (1963) ("unfair competitive practice" under
FTC Act), rev'd on other grounds, American Cyanamid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757
(6th Cir. 1966). See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 200 (1962) (White,
J., concurring): "[C]ollusion to secure a [patent] monopoly grant runs afoul of the
Sherman Act's prohibition against conspiracies in restraint of trade .... "
Some of the leading cases holding that fraud in the procurement renders a patent
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tracts that prolong a restraint of trade through licensing of fraudulent
patents should be sanctioned as severely. The parties injured by an
agreement that conceals patent unenforceability include all who have
an interest in challenging the patent, especially alleged infringers. This
theory would therefore provide alleged infringers an additional method
to attack fraudulent patents. The gravamen of the claim would be
that the patentee perpetuated a restraint of trade by issuing a license
and thereby discouraging the licensee from discovering and revealing
the patent fraud.
The sanction would be limited to a patentee who either knew that
the patent was unenforceable or knew the facts leading to that legal
conclusion when issuing the license, 78 that is, a patentee who has deliberately committed fraud on the Patent Office that would render the
patent unenforceable. If unenforceability does not require proof of
material fraud, 79 all the elements of unenforceability are within the
fraudulent patentee's knowledge.
There are significant problems of proof in determining the appropriate amount of damages, especially if damages were to run from the
date that, but for the license, the licensee would have obtained a
judicial declaration of the invalidity of the patent. Of course, since the
license is the agreement that effects perpetuation of the restraint of
trade, the latter problem could be solved by measuring damages from
the date the license was granted.
4. Exclusive Dealing. Consumers and sellers of infringing goods
purchased from a patentee's unlicensed competitors are liable as infringers of the patentee's patent.8 0 If a patent is ostensibly valid,
customers will often choose to buy from the patentee rather than
an allegedly infringing seller to avoid this liability. In the case of a
unenforceable involved fraudulent agreements rather than unilateral fraud by the patent
applicant. E.g., Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324
U.S. 806 (1945) (unclean hands); Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S.
238 (1944). No court, in cases decided after Walker Process, has dealt with the argu-

ment that a fraudulent agreement would meet the "contract, combination, or conspiracy"
requirement of section I of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
78 This limitation is necessary to allow settlement of a patent dispute by issuing a

license. When a fraudulent patentee contests a challenge to a patent, hope of success is
based not on a belief in the validity of the patent but on the hope that the challenger
will be unable to prove the underlying fraud. From the fraudulent patentee's viewpoint,
the settlement of a patent dispute represents an arrangement to continue exploitation of
a fraudulent patent, rather than a compromise of an unresolved dispute. Thus, application of antitrust sanctions to licenses under fraudulent patents will not deter attempts
to settle bona fide disputes under nonfraudulent patents by issuing licenses.
79 See text and notes at notes 18-21 and 38-44 supra.

80 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1970).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[41:775

fraudulently procured patent; sales to customers may violate the prohibition in section 3 of the Clayton Act against "a sale or contract for
sale of goods . . . [on the] . . . understanding that the . . . purchaser
of a competitor ... of
thereof shall not use or deal in the goods ..

the... seller, where the effect of such... understanding may be to
lessen competition .... ",s
The requisite effect on competition under this provision of the
Clayton Act is less than that required for monopolization under the
Sherman Act.8 2 The Clayton Act deals with a "substantial lessening" of
competition and use of the word "may" indicates that a potential
lessening may suffice. 3 Furthermore, a patent "is at least prima facie
evidence" of the power to cause this effect on competition "although in
fact there may be many competing substitutes for the patented
article."8 4 Relevant market inquiry would therefore be unnecessary
when the Clayton Act is used to attack a fraudulently procured patent.
The "understanding" that a customer will not purchase the goods8 5
of a competitor is usually not explicit in sales agreements for patented
goods, but may reasonably be read into the sale when the customer
knows that the good is patented and that purchases from the patentee's
competitor involve potential liability for infringement.8 " This knowledge is usually present when the patentee informs the customer or the
trade that the competitor is infringing, or when the patentee threatens
litigation.
This remedy would be available to potential and actual purchasers
and users of the patented good. Under an extension of Walker Process,
this proposed antitrust remedy would reach only holders of fraudulently
procured patents; bona fide patentees would be protected by the
principle that protects a valid patent monopoly.
CONCLUSIONS
Current remedies for fraud on the Patent Office--cancellation of the
patent, the defense of unenforceability, and the Walker Process antitrust
15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 335 (1961); Mercantile Nat'l
Bank v. Quest, Inc., 303 F. Supp. 926, 935 (D. Ind. 1969); Fagan v. Sunbeam Lighting Co.,
303 F. Supp. 356, 361 (S.D. Ill. 1969).
83 National Dairy Prod. Corp. v. FTC, 395 F.2d 517 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 977 (1969).
84 Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 307 (1949).
85 This remedy would not reach fraudulently procured process patents. Section 3 of
the Clayton Act applies only to sales or to contracts for sale of "goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies and other commodities." 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
86 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1970).
81
82
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suit-are unable to deter patent fraud and redress effectively the harm
caused by that fraud. This comment has proposed several approaches
under the common law doctrine of misrepresentation and the antitrust
laws that provide more effective deterrence and relief. Although each
approach presents difficulties, together they may expand the category of
potential plaintiffs, simplify the burden of proof, and permit recovery
of fill compensation and punitive damages.
Kenneth L. Spector

